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A B S T R A C T
T h e  b a c k g ro u n d  se c t io n  o f th e  a r t ic le  d ea ls  w ith  A q u in a s 's  and  S c o tu s 's  
d e f in it io n  o f th e  re la t io n  be tw een  in te l le c t  and  s e n se s . It is  show n th a t  
A q u in a s  p o s tu la te d  a sp e c ie s  in te rm e d ia ry  be tw een  th e  tw o , w h ile  S co tu s  
o n ly  p o s tu la te d  i t  fo r  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n . O ckham  rem oves th e  
in t e l l ig ib le  a sp c ie s  a lto g e th e r ,  s t r e s s in g  th e  r e l ia b i l i t y  o f in t u it iv e  c o g ­
n it io n  as th e  b a s is  o f  c e r t it u d e  ab o u t p re s e n t  s itu a t io n s ,  w h ile  p e r fe c t  
in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  is  th e  b a s is  o f c e r t it u d e  ab o u t p a s t s itu a t io n . 
O ckh a m 's  th e o r ie s  o f th e  h a b itu s  a re  d is c u s s e d  as seem ing  to  c o n t ra d ic t  
th e  p r in c ip le  o f th e  r a z o r ,  b u t  a re  d e m o n s tra ted  no t to  in v o lv e  e x te rn a l 
in te rm e d ia r ie s .  O ckh a m 's  e p is te m o lo g y  s a fe g u a rd s  th e  in t r in s ic  p s y c h o ­
lo g ic a l u n ity  o f man an d  a llow s a m ore d ir e c t  kno w led g e  o f th e  w ro ld , in  
th a t  it  d e r ie v e s  u n iv e r s a ls  from  p a r t ic u la r s  and  does sw ay  w ith  A q u in a s 's  
u n w ie ld y  th e o r ie s  o f i llu m in a t io n  and  a b s t ra c t io n . B e cau se  a ll k n o w ledge  
b e g in s  w ith  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , an e m p ir ic a l s c ie n t if ic  m ethod is  fo r  th e  
f i r s t  tim e ju s t if ie d .  T h e  a r t ic le  c o n c lu d e s  w ith  a s h o r t  d is c u s s io n  o f 
O ckh am 's  th e o r ie s  o f s ig n if ic a t io n  and  co n c e p tu a lism , w h ich  to g e th e r  w ith  
h is  em ph as is  on e m p ir ic ism  c le a r  th e  w ay fo r  th e  sy s te m a t ic  d eve lo pm en t 
o f lo g ic .
In th e  fo llo w in g  a c co u n t m y p u rp o se  is  to  p ro v id e  a s h o r t  e x p o s it io n  o f 
O ckh am 's  th e o ry  o f kn o w led g e , h a v in g  re la te d  th is  b r ie f ly  to  p re v io u s  
c o g n it iv e  th e o r ie s ,  and  to  s u g g e s t  some co n se q u e n ce s .
B a c k g ro u n d
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O ckham  d e p a rte d  from  m any o f h is  p re d e c e s s o rs  in  a p p ro a ch in g  the  
q u e s t io n  o f k n o w ledge , w h e th e r  o f s in g u la rs  o r  o f u n iv e r s a ls ,  b y  s ta r t in g  
w ith  th e  s in g u la r  o b je c t r a th e r  th an  w ith  th e  u n iv e r s a l and  e n q u ir in g  
how u n iv e r s a ls  co u ld  be know n from  s in g u la r  o b je c ts .
Thom as A q u in a s  had had to  come to  te rm s w ith  th e  o b s e rv a t io n s  th a t the  
human in te l le c t  does know  m ate ria l o b je c ts  ( in  th e  sen se  o f b e in g  aw are 
o f th em ), and  th a t sen se  im p re s s io n s  a re  th e  p r im a ry  means o f know ledge . 
H is  p rob lem  was p a r t ly  to  d e f in e  the  re la t io n  betw een in te l le c t  and sen se s , 
as th e  fo rm e r was he ld  to  be im m ateria l and th e  la t t e r  w e re  m a te ria l sen se  
o rg a n s  a c t iv a te d  b y  th e  o b je c ts  sen sed . In o th e r  w o rd s , how was he to 
b r id g e  the  g ap ' se e m ing ly  in h e re n t  in  th e  A r is to te l ia n  ax iom ', In te lle c tu s  
e s t u n iv e rs a liu m , sen su s  autem  p a r t ic u la r iu m '?  In fa c t A q u in a s  he ld  th a t 
th e  in te l le c t  can no t know  p a r t ic u la r s  d ir e c t ly ,  b u t o n ly  u n iv e r s a ls .  He 
a rg u e d  th is  p o in t in th re e  p rem isse s : th e  p r in c ip le  o f s ir g u la r i t y  in 
m a te r ia l th in g s  is m a tte r; o u r  in te l le c t  u n d e rs ta n d s  b y  a b s t ra c t in g  th e  
in t e l l ig ib le  sp e c ie s  from  su ch  m a tte r; th a t w h ich  is th u s  a b s t ra c te d  is th e  
u n iv e r s a l (D a y , 1947 :26 ,27 ).
T h e  T h o m is t ic  (and  S c o t is t ic )  th e o ry  o f k n o w ledge  was based  on th a t 
w h ich  was th o u g h t to  be A r is to t le 's ,  in  w h ich  u n iv e r s a l k n o w ledge  is  the  
m ost p e r fe c t  fo rm  o f k n o w ledge , and  n o th in g  is  in  th e  in te l le c t  w h ich  
was no t f i r s t  in th e  sen se s . P a r t ic u la r  (m a te r ia l)  o b je c ts  a re  re p re se n te d  
in th e  m ind b y  th e  sp e c ie s  s e n s ib i l is ',  w h ich  is  illu m in a ted  b y  th e  l ig h t  
o f th e  a c t iv e  in te l le c t ,  and  th e re b y  made im m ateria l and  so in te l l ig ib le .  
T h is  i llu m in a t io n  is th en  th e  a b s t ra c t io n  o f w h ich  A q u in a s  ta lk s  (D ay , 
1947:115). T h e  th e o ry  o f a b s t ra c t io n  c le a r ly  d ep e n d s  h e a v ily  on the  
A r is to te l ia n  (and  u lt im a te ly  P la to n ic )  a ssu m p tio n  th a t in d iv id u a l th in g s  
p o sse ss  some so rt o f u n iv e r s a l e ssen ce  w h ich  can be d is e n g a g e d  from  them 
and  know n b y  th e  in te lle c t :  th e re  is sa id  to  be a d icho to m y  betw een 
m a te r ia l and  im m ateria l th in g s .  B u t  it  seems to  me th a t th e  d icho tom y  
is  h a rd ly  so lv e d  b y  th e  p o s tu la t io n  o f su ch  a s p e c ie s , fo r  th e  fa c t  th a t 
th e  sp e c ie s  has to  be illu m in a te d ' b e fo re  it  a c q u ire s  im m a te r ia lity  s u g ­
g e s ts  th a t it  is a m a te r ia l e n t it y .
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In a n y  ca se , i t  is  p r e c is e ly  th is  p r in c ip le  o f th e  a b s t ra c t io n  o f a sp e c ie s  
w h ich  cau se s  O ckham  to  re c o n s id e r :  bo th  b eca u se  a b s t ra c t io n  is he ld  to 
be th e  o n ly  w ay  in  w h ich  th e  m ind  know s in t e l le c tu a l ly ,  and  b eca u se  a 
sp e c ie s  has to  be p o s tu la te d  as th a t w h ich  is  a b s t ra c te d . F o r him  th is  
p r in c ip le  lim its  th e  w ays  in  w h ich  th e  in te l le c t  k no w s, in c re a se s  th e  
d is ta n c e  be tw een  th e  m ind  and  w h a t is  p e rc e iv e d , and  is  uneconom ica l. 
E ven  fo r  A q u in a s  th e  in te l le c t  does know  p a r t ic u la r s ,  th o u g h  in d ir e c t ly ,  
as D ay  p o in ts  o u t (1947 :28 ).
It a p p e a rs  to  me th a t  th e  p r in c ip le  o f a b s t ra c t io n  is  m a in ly  a d e v ic e  aimed 
a t p re v e n t in g  d ir e c t  co n ta c t betw een th e  m ind  and  m a tte r, and  ends in 
a c i r c u la r  a rgum en t: th e  m ind , it  is  a ssu m ed , u n d e rs ta n d s  b y  a b ­
s t r a c t io n .  B u t  one can n o t a b s t ra c t  n o th in g , th e re fo re  a sp e c ie s  is  p o s ­
tu la te d  to  be a b s t ra c te d . T h is  sp e c ie s  is  u n iv e r s a l,  o th e rw is e  it  co u ld  
no t be a b s t ra c te d . o r  th e  m ind  to  u n d e rs ta n d  i t ,  it  m ust be a b s t ra c te d  
from  s in g u la r  m a tte r . A n d  so fo r th .  T h is  th e o ry  a ssum es, th e re fo re ,  
th a t  one  m ust b eg in  w ith  th e  u n iv e r s a l c o n ce p t , no t th e  p a r t ic u la r .
E ven  i f  it  is  g ra n te d  th a t th e  m ind  u n d e rs ta n d s  m a te r ia l p a r t ic u la r s  in ­
d i r e c t ly ,  th e  p re c is e  n a tu re  o f t h is  c o n p re h e n s io n  m ust s t i l l  be dem on­
s tra te d ;  so it  w o u ld  be e a s ie r  to  show  th a t  th e  in te l le c t  a c tu a lly  know s 
m a te r ia l p a r t ic u la r s  d ir e c t ly .  T h e n  th e  p rob lem  fa lls  aw ay . A n d  some 
la te r  s c h o la s t ic s  a ttem p ted  ju s t  th is ,  p o s it in g  both  an im m ediate in t e l le c ­
tu a l a p p re h e n s io n  o f s in g u la r s  (m a te r ia l ones to o , in d ep e n d en ce  on th e  
se n se s )  as e x is t in g  and  p re s e n t  fo r  th e  o b s e r v e r ,  and an im m ediate a p ­
p re h e n s io n  o f p a r t ic u la r s  w h ich  a b s t ra c ts  from  th e se  d a ta . O n ly  th en , 
a c c o rd in g  to  them , does th e  m ind  b e g in  to  fo rm  co n ce p ts  abou t u n i­
v e r s a l  .
T h e se  tw o im m ediate c o g n it io n s  ( th e  f i r s t  te rm ed  in t u it iv e ,  th e  second  
a b s t ra c t iv e )  a re  p o s tu la te d  b y  bo th  S co tu s  and  O ckham  in  an a ttem p t to  
d e s c r ib e  in  p s y c h o lo g ic a l te rm s w hat a c tu a lly  h a p p e n s , so a v o id in g  th e  
d i f f ic u lt ie s  o u t lin e d  abo ve . S co tu s  d is t in g u is h e s  betw een two su ch  acts  
o f th e  in te l le c t ,  a d is t in c t io n  w h ich  is ,  h o w e ve r, o n ly  a p p lic a b le  on th e  
le v e l o f s im p le  a p p re h e n s io n . F o r  h im , a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  is an 
in t e l le c t iv e  (b u t  s im p le  a p p re h e n s iv e )  a c t w h ich  re g a rd s  an o b je c t, com ­
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p le te ly  in d if f e r e n t  as to  w h e th e r  th a t o b je c t is  p re s e n t  o r  even  in  e x is t ­
en ce , w h ile  in t u it iv e  co g n it io n  re g a rd s  an o b je c t o f o u r  know ledge  w h ich  
is  bo th  e x is t in g  and  p re s e n t  (D a y , 1947 :34 ,35 ).
T h e  fo rm e r c o g n it io n  is  fo r  S co tu s  a m a tte r o f common e x p e r ie n c e , as fo r  
exam p le  th e  case  w h e re  I can have  a m ental im age o f , s a y , W inston  
C h u r c h i l l ,  th o u g h  he is n e ith e r  p re s e n t  no r e x is t in g .  B u t in tu it iv e  
c o g n it io n  is  not so  c e r ta in ly  e x p e r ie n c e d , so S co tu s  a ttem p ts to  p ro v e  its  
e x is te n c e  (D a y , 1947 :52 -54 ), even  i f  no t on e a r th ,  th en  c e r t a in ly  in 
h e a ven , w h e re  th e re  w ill be d ir e c t  know ledge  o f G od . A  l it t le  la te r , 
im p lic it ly  r e b u t t in g  th e  A r is to te l ia n  a x io m ', S co tu s  d e c la re s  th a t th e  
d is t in c t io n  betw een in te l le c t  and  sen se  sh o u ld  be u n d e rs to o d  no t as a 
d is t in c t io n  betw een d if fe r e n t  fa c u lt ie s ,  b u t as th e  d if fe r e n c e  betw een a 
s u p e r io r  c o g n it iv e  fa c u lt y  and  one su b o rd in a te  to  it ,  b u t  non e th e le ss  
c o g n it iv e .  In o th e r  w o rd s , th e  in te l le c t  can know  an y  o b je c t u n d e r  any 
a sp e c t - in  an y  mode o f co g n it io n  - b u t  th e  (e x te rn a l)  sen se s  a re  lim ited  
to  one  mode ( in tu it iv e  c o g n it io n ) ;  th en  can o n ly  know  an o b je c t 's u b  
ra t io n e  e x is te n t is ' (q uo te d  in  D ay , 1947:60).
S co tu s  co n t in u e s  to  d is t in g u is h  p re c is e ly  betw een th e  tw o co g n it io n s  
(D a y , 1947:67), and  a rg u e s  th e  fact o f a b s t ra c t iv e  kno w ledge  (one o f 
h is  p ro o fs  b e in g  common e x p e r ie n c e , as was no ted  above ) and  th e  pos­
sibility o f in t u it iv e  kn o w ledge  ( in te r  a lia , from  th e  hope o f h e a v e n ) . 
From  th e  Oxoniense, II, d .3 ,  q .9 ,  n .6  (D a y , 1947:72) it  may be seen th a t 
th e  d is t in c t io n  lie s  not in  what is  know n , b u t in  how it  is know n: in t u it iv e  
la y s  ho ld  o f w hat a b s t ra c t iv e  kno w ledge  does no t, th e  a c tu a l e x is te n c e  
and  p re se n ce  o f an ob jec t.
In Book  111 o f th e  same w o rk  S co tu s  fu r t h e r  d is t in g u is h e s  betw een p e r fe c t  
and  im p e rfe c t in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n :  th e  la t t e r  e s t o p in io  de fu tu r o  ve l 
memoria de p ra e te r ito ';  th e  fo rm e r e s t de o b ie c to  p r a e s e n t s ia lit e r  
e x is te n s ' (D a y , 1947:78). Im pe rfe c t in t u it iv e  co g n it io n  is  th u s  to  S co tu s  
th e  a c t o f rem em bering  o r  a n t ic ip a t io n ;  p e r fe c t  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , h o w ­
e v e r ,  c o -o p e ra te s ' w ith  the  in te l le c t  in  p ro d u c in g  a h a b it  in  th e  in te l le c t ,  
w h ich  re s u lt s  in a h a b itu a l (o r  im p e rfe c t)  in t u it iv e  co g n it io n  in  the  
( in te l le c t iv e )  m em ory. ( T h is  d e f in it io n  and  S c o tu s 's  o th e r  th e o r ie s  he re
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w ill be im p o rta n t w hen we come to  O ckh am 's  d eve lo pm en t o f S c o tu s .)  
A n d  p e r fe c t  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  know s th e  s in g u la r  as su ch  C u t  h o c ')  and 
as e x is t in g  ( ’e x is te n s  e s t ’ , D ay  1947:82). T h is  th e o ry  has a c le a r  
e p is te m o lo g ica l im p o rt w h ich  was f u l ly  re c o g n iz e d  as su ch  b y  S co tu s : it  
p ro v id e s  a b a s is  fo r  c e r t it u d e .  H o w eve r, im p e r fe c t in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , 
i t  seems to  me, does no t know  th e  in d iv id u a l in  it s e lf ,  b u t  ra th e r  know s 
it  b y  som eth ing  w h ich  e n ca p su la te s  th e  o b je c t , e it h e r  a p a s t m em ory o r 
a fu tu r e  ’o p in io n '.  H ence  S co tu s  has no t d is p o se d  o f th e  in te rm e d ia te  
s p e c ie s  e n t ir e ly .
In Book  IV  o f th e  O xon iense S co tu s  ag a in  ad d u ce s  e v id e n ce  in  s u p p o r t  
o f th e  th e o ry  o f in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  and  its  im p o rtan ce  fo r  c e r t it u d e  abou t 
o u r  in t e r io r  a c ts : S i non haberem us . . .  co n g it io n em  s ic |  in tu it iv a m , 
non s c ire m u s  de a c t ib u s  n o s t r is  . . . v e l non c e r t it u d in a li t e r ' (D ay , 
1947 :87 ). T h e  im p lic a t io n  is c le a r ly  th a t  in t u it iv e  cog i it  ion is  p o s s ib le  
in  th is  l i f e ,  not m e re ly  in  th e  n e x t . F in a l ly ,  in  th is  same Book  S co tu s  
o b s e rv e s  th a t th e  tw o c o g n it io n s  a re  s p e c if ic a l ly  d is t in c t ,  b e cau se  the  
p a r t ia l c au se s  o f a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  a re  th e  sp e c ie s  and  th e  in te l le c t ,  
b u t  th o se  o f in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  a re  th e  res p ra e se n s  in  s e ’ (D ay , 
1947:89; my it a l ic iz a t io n ) and  th e  in te l le c t .
W ith  re g a rd  to  A q u in a s ’ s p o s tu la t io n  o f a sp e c ie s  as in te rm e d ia ry  betw een 
in te l le c t  and  se n se s , i t  is  im p o rtan t to  know  S c o tu s s  v ie w s . A s  D ay  
o b s e rv e s  (1947:105) th e re  is  c r i t ic a l  d is a g re e m e n t o v e r  w h e th e r  S co tu s  s 
c o n ce p t io n  o f in t u it iv e  kn o w ledge  n e ce ss ita te s  a s p e c ie s . H ow eve r, 
S co tu s  h im se lf c le a r ly  s ta te s , Sed is ta  c o g n it io  ( in tu it iv e )  non e s t p e r  
a liq uam  spec iem , v e l h ab itum , q u i p o s s it  esse  de re  non e x is te n te ' in  Book  
II o f th e  O xon ienso  (D a y , 1947:109). W here he does m ention  a sp ec ie s  
he is  m ost l ik e ly  r e f e r r in g  to  a b s t ra c t io n  o r  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n , a l­
th o u g h  he does no t a lw a ys  d is t in g u is h  be tw een  the  tw o k in d s  o f c o g n it io n .
P ro ce e d in g  in  th is  fa sh io n  S co tu s  rem oves th e  d i f f ic u lt ie s  posed  b y  the  
ax iom ' o f A r is to t le  to  o u r  kno w led g e  o f s in g u la r s  a n d , in  h is  in s is te n c e  
on th e  d if fe r e n c e  betw een th e  tw o k in d s  o f kno w led g e  and  th e  concom itan t 
im m ed iacy  o f in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , w h ich  no lo n g e r  needed  an in te rm e d ia ry  
s p e c ie s , p a ved  th e  w ay fo r  O ckham  s tre a tm en t o f th e  same them e; Day
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(1947:143-5) l is t s  s e v e ra l o c ca s io n s  w h e re  th e  la t t e r  a ckno w ledge s  h is  
d eb t to th e  fo rm e r.
O ckham 's  c o n t r ib u t io n
O ckham  rem oves th e  in t e l l ig ib le  sp ec ie s  a lto g e th e r  from  th e  scen e , even 
from  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n . S co tu s  te nded  to  s t re s s  th e  d if fe re n c e s  o f 
th e  tw o k in d s  o f s im p le  a p p re h e n s iv e  kno w ledge ; O ckham  sees in tu it iv e  
co g n it io n  as fo rm in g  th e  fo u n d a t io n  on w h ich  a b s t ra c t iv e  kn o w ledge  (and  
hence  a ll o th e r  m ore com p lex fo rm s o f kn o w led g e ) re s t s .
He b e g in s  w ith  th e  b a s ic  q u e ry ,  'U tru m  s it  p o s s ib i le  in te lle c tu a l v ia to r is  
habe re  no tit iam  e v id en tem  . . . ? '  (Opera T h e o lo g ie s , I, 1967: P ro lo g u e , q .1 ,  
p . 3 , h e ad in g ; th e re a f t e r  c ite d  s im p ly  as O T , 1967:page num ber; lin e  
n u m b e r) . B u t h s is  a th eo lo g ica l ra th e r  th an  a p h ilo so p h ic a l q u e r y ,  fo r  
he end s it  w ith  th e  w o rd s , ' . . .  de  v ir i t a t ib u s  th e o lo g ia e '. He an sw e rs  
h is  own q u e s t io n  b y  d e c la r in g  th a t he w ill assum e c e r ta in  p re s u p p o s it io n s ,  
su ch  as th a t G od  e x is t s ,  has in t u it iv e  kno w led g e  o f h im se lf , and  is  
om n ipo ten t - th e re fo re  b y  v ir t u e  o f h is  a b so lu te  pow e r c o u ld  c re a te  in  
man a kn o w ledge  of a n o n -e x is te n t  th in g .  T h is  la s t  a ssu m p tio n  cau sed  
m uch t ro u b le  fo r  O ckham  in  th a t he was a c cu se d  o f h e re s y ;  h is  a c c u se rs  
fa ile d  to  p e rc e iv e  th a t  O ckham  a lso  d e c la re d  th a t G od  n o rm a lly  e x e rc is e s  
o n ly  h is  o rd a in e d  p ow e r, and  is  th e re fo re  no t r e a lly  a d e c e iv e r .  T h e  
Q u o d lib e t 6 ( L e f f ,  1965:16) m akes c le a r  th a t  G o d 's  o rd a in e d  pow e r a c ts  
w ith in  th e  lim its  o f th e  law s G od  h im se lf in s t it u te d .
O ckham  o b s e rv e s  th a t  e v id e n t  k n o w ledge  (w h ich  o f c o u r s e  is  h is  b a s ic  
c o n c e rn )  e s t c o g n it io  a l ic u iu s  v e r i co m p le x i, ex n o t it ia  te rm in o ru m  
in co m p lexa ' (O T , 19G7: 5; 1 9 f). T h is  s ta tem en t and  its  c o n te x t  s u g g e s t 
th a t e v id e n t  kn o w ledge  d ep e n d s  on th e  way in  w h ich  th e  te rm s o f a p r o ­
p o s it io n  a re  know n ; fu r th e rm o re , e v id e n t  kno w led g e  is  m ore co m p re h e n ­
s iv e  th an  a n y  o th e r  kn o w ledge , even  w isdom  (O T , 1967:6 ; 5 -6 ) ;  it  can  
know  c o n t in g e n t p ro p o s it io n s  too  (O T , 1967 : 6; 6 -7 ) .  He a s s e r ts  th a t 
th e re  a re  tw o k in d s  o f k n o w ledge , com p lex  and  in co m p lex ; and  th is  in ­
com p lex kno w led g e  is  i t s e lf  o f tw o k in d s  (D a y , 1947:146): 'd u a s  n o t it ia s  
in co m p lexa s  sp e c ie  d is t in c ta s  q ua ru m  una . .  . in t u it iv e  e t a lia  a b s t ra c t iv e '
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(O T , 1967:15; 1 5 -17 ). It w ill be no ted  th a t th is  fo rm u la  echoes S c o tu s 's  
id e a s , th o u g h  it  was no t n e c e s s a r i ly  d e r iv e d  from  him .
T o  h a ve  su ch  e v id e n t  kn o w ledge  o f th e  te rm s o f a c o n t in g e n t p ro p o s it io n , 
i t  is  n e c e s s a ry  to  p o s se s s  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  (O T , 1967:15; 10 -12 ). 
h e n ce , in  th is  ( la te r )  w o rk  o f h is  O ckham  lo ca te s  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  at 
th e  c e n t r e  o f th e  p rob lem  o f c e r t it u d e ,  as D ay  no tes (1947 :148). O ckham  
th e n  no te s  th a t th e re  a re  tw o a c ts  o f  th e  in te l le c t  to  be c o n s id e re d , an 
'a c tu s  a p p re h e n s iv u s ’ w h ich  a p p re h e n d s  e v e r y th in g ,  w h e th e r  com p lex  o r  
no t, an d  an 'a c tu s  iu d ic a t iv u s ' b y  w h ich  a s s e n t o r  d is s e n t  o n ly  to  a 
com p lex  p ro p o s it io n  is  g iv e n  (O T , 1967: 16; 6 -1 8 ) . A p p re h e n s io n  p r e ­
cede s  th is  a c t o f ju dgm en t (O T , 1967:17; 15-17) and is  i t s e lf  com posed 
o f tw o k in d s  o f s im p le  kno w led g e  o f te rm s ( 'in c o m p le x a ')  o f a p ro p o s it io n
- S c o tu s 's  in t u it iv e  and  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n .
A s  w ith  h is  p re d e c e s s o r ,  O ckham  w ish e s  to  show  th a t  th e se  a re  d is t in c t ,  
a n d  p ro v e s  th is  p o in t b y  a c h a r a c te r is t ic  appea l to  e x p e r ie n c e  C s ic u t  p e r  
e x p e r ie n t ia m  p a te t ',  O T , 1967: 23; 4 f ) .  A no n -com p le x  c o g n it io n  o f bo th  
S o c ra te s  and  w h ite n e s s  is no t an e v id e n t  kno w led g e  o f w h e th e r  So c ra te s  
is  w h ite  o r  no t. B u t  th e re  is a n o th e r  kno w led g e  b y  w h ich  th e  in te l le c t  
can  know  e v id e n t ly  th a t  S o c ra te s  is  w h ite , i f  he  is  w h ite  (O ckham , 
1957 :20 ). T h e se  r e s u lt s  o f th e  tw o c o g n it io n s  a re  so  d is p a ra te  th a t th e re  
m u s t e x is t  tw o d is t in c t  k in d s  o f kno w ledge : one  can  cau se  e v id e n t  
k n o w le d g e , one  c a n n o t (O T , 1967: 23; 7 -1 0 ) .
T h u s  f a r  O ckham  has d is c u s s e d  o n ly  o b je c ts  w h ich  can  be sen sed , b u t  
th e  d is t in c t io n  be tw een  th e  tw o c o g n it io n s  a lso  a p p lie s  to  u n -s e n s a b le  
o b je c ts ,  b e ca u se  'e v e ry o n e  e x p e r ie n c e s  in  h im se lf th a t he u n d e rs ta n d s , 
lo v e s ,  is  p le a se d , is  s a d ' (O ckh am , 1957: 21 and  O T , 1967: 28; 14 -16). 
T h e s e  a re  c o n t in g e n t fa c ts ,  th e re fo re  k n o w led g e  abo u t them  can n o t be 
o b ta in e d  from  n e c e s sa ry  p ro p o s it io n s ,  fo r  c o n t in g e n t fa c ts  a re  n e v e r  
n e c e s s a ry .  O f th e  th re e  a lte rn a t iv e  s o lu t io n s  to  th is  p rob lem , O ckham  
d e c la re s  th a t  th e  second  w ay  o f o b ta in in g  kn o w ledge  abo u t su ch  p r o p ­
o s it io n s  is  th e  b e s t:  'S i d e tu r  se cu n d u m , h a b e tu r  p ro p o s itu m , qu o d  so la  
n o t it ia  in co m p lexa  te rm in o ru m  m ere in te l l ig ib il iu m  s u f f ic i t  ad  no tit iam  
e v id e n te m  ta lis  v e r i t a t is  c o n t in g e n t is ' (O T , 1967: 29; 3 -5 ) .
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O ckham  m a in ta in s , th e re fo re ,  th a t th e re  a re  tw o w a ys  o f k n o w in g  som e­
th in g  n o n -co m p le x : one  a b s t ra c t iv e ,  th e  o th e r  in t u it iv e  (O ckham , 
1957:22); th e  f i r s t  n e v e r  c a u s in g  e v id e n t  a s s e n t , b u t  th e  second  do in g  
so . A n d  th is  is  r e a lly  w h a t he had  in te n d e d  to  p ro v e  (O T , 1967: 30; 
8 - 11) .
A b s t r a c t iv e  c o g n it io n  can be ta ke n  in  tw o sen se s : as c o g n it io n  o f a u n i­
v e r s a l w h ich  can  be a b s t ra c te d  from  m any th in g s  (O T , 1967 : 30; 12 -15), 
o r  - w h ich  is  th e  sen se  O ckham  w ill u se  - i t  'a b s t r a h it  ab  e x s is te n t ia  et 
non e x s is te n t ia  e t ab  a l i is  c o n d ic io n ib u s  quae  c o n t in g e n te r  a c c id u n t  re i 
v e l p ra e d ic a n tu r  de re ' (O T ,  1967: 31; 4 - 6 ) .  A b s t r a c t iv e  c o g n it io n  is 
no t, th e re fo re ,  c o n ce rn e d  w ith  th e  a c tu a l e x is te n c e  o f a th in g ,  w h ile  th e  
d is t in g u is h in g  fe a tu re  o f in t u it iv e  co g n it io n  is  p r e c is e ly  th a t i t  'e nab le s  
us to know  w h e th e r  th e  th in g  e x is ts  o r  does no t e x is t ' (O ckh am , 
1957:23), and  a lso  g iv e s  us know ledge  o f th e  re a t io n s  be tw een  th in g s .  
Indeed , g e n e ra lly  s p e a k in g , an y  non -com p le x  c o g n it io n  o f one  o r  m ore 
te rm s o r  th in g s ,  is an in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , if  it  e n ab le s  us  to  know  a 
co n t in g e n t t r u th ,  e s p e c ia lly  abou t p re s e n t  fa c ts ' (O ckh am , 1957:23). 
O nce  aga in  O ckh am 's  s t re s s  on d ire c tn e s s  and  econom y is  a p p a re n t.
A s  w ith  S c o tu s , fo r  O ckham  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  is  in d if f e r e n t  to  e x is t ­
ence  o r  n o n -e x is te n c e  (O ckh am , 1957:23). Y e t ,  s in c e  we do  a p p re h e n d  
e x is te n t ia l t r u t h s ,  th e re  m ust be a n o th e r  k in d  o f c o g n it io n  c o n ce rn e d  
w ith  e x is te n c e , u n lik e  a b s t ra c t iv e ;  e t i l ia  e r i t  in t u i t iv e ’ (O T , 1967:23; 
20, and  see w ho le  p a ra g ra p h ) .
T h u s  f a r  O ckham  has been re p ro d u c in g  S co tu s ; now he b e g in s  to  d if f e r .  
F o r  S co tu s  th e  'r e s  p ra e se n s  in  se ' was one  o f th e  cau se s  o f in t u it iv e  
c o g n it io n ;  O ckham  s a y s  th is  need no t a t a ll be  th e  ca se , g iv in g  as h is  
rea son  th e  f i r s t  a r t ic le  o f th e  C re e d  - fo r ,  he  d e c la re s  in  th e  
Q u o d lib e tn , th is  im p lie s  th a t 'a n y th in g  is  to  be a t t r ib u te d  to  th e  d iv in e  
p ow e r, w hen it  does no t c o n ta in  a m an ife s t c o n t ra d ic t io n . B u t  th a t th is  
( i . e .  c o g n it io n  o f a n o n -e x is te n t  o b je c t)  s h o u ld  b e  p ro d u c e d  b y  th e  p ow er 
o f G od , does no t co n ta in  a c o n t ra d ic t io n ' (O ckh am , 1957:25). It is  in ­
te r e s t in g  to  no te  th a t th is  w ou ld  a p p e a r to  b e  a th e o lo g ic a l as m uch as 
a lo g ic a l a p p lic a t io n  o f th e  p r in c ip le  o f econom y: G od  as f i r s t  c au se  needs
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no s e c o n d a ry  c a u se s , in d eed  th e  fe w e r  th e  b e t te r .  It is  a lso  w o rth  
n o th in g  th a t  th e  in s is te n c e  o f G o d 's  no t c o n t ra d ic t in g  h im se lf is  ag a in  a 
lo g ica l as m uch as a th e o lo g ic a l p o in t . O ckham  is  e q u a lly  th eo lo g ia n  and  
p h ilo s o p h e r .
W hat O ckham  has ju s t  s a id  is  an a p p a re n t c o n t ra d ic t io n ,  fo r  d id  he no t 
s t r e s s  th a t  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  is  o n ly  co n ce rn e d  w ith  a c tu a lly  e x is t in g  
th in g s ?  B u t  he goes on to  m ake it  c le a r  th a t  he is  h e re  ta lk in g  abou t 
s u p e rn a tu ra l c au se s : So f a r  as n a tu ra l c au se s  a re  in  q u e s t io n , an in ­
t u i t iv e  c o g n it io n  ca n n o t b e  c au sed  o r  p re s e rv e d  if  th e  o b je c t does no t 
e x is t ' (O ckh am , 1957:26).
N o rm a lly , th e re fo re ,  w hen G od  does no t e x e rc is e  h is  a b so lu te  p ow e r, 
in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  g u a ra n te e s  c e r t it u d e  abo u t e x is te n t ia l p ro p o s it io n s  (see  
a lso  D a y , 1 9 4 7 :1 '4 ) . C le a r ly  O ckh am 's  aim is  to  c o v e r  a ll p o s s ib i l i t ie s  
in  h is  d e f in it io n  o f w h a t can  be re a lly  e v id e n t  ( to  G od  as w e ll as to  men)
- e ven  i f ,  to  p u t  it  c r u d e ly ,  th e  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  a re  as u n l ik e ly  as man see in g  
som e th ing  th a t  is  no t th e re . A s  B o e h n e r  (1943:230) o b s e rv e s ,  to  O ckham  
th e re  is  no c o n t ra d ic t io n  in v o lv e d  becau se  D eus habe t no tit iam  in tu it iv a m  
om nium , s iv e  s in t ,  s iv e  non s in t '.  A n d  th e re  can  be no ra t io n a l p ro o f 
o f th is ;  e ith e r  one a c ce p ts  th a t th e re  is  a m y s te ry  s u r ro u n d in g  G o d 's  
k n o w ledge  - if  he e x is ts  - o r  one  does no t. T h is  ty p e  o f p re s u p p o s it io n  
is  u n a rg u a b le .
In fa c t O ckham  p o in ts  o u t th a t w e re  G od  to  cau se  us to  b e lie v e  th a t 
som eth ing  is p re s e n t  when it  is  a b se n t , su ch  a b e lie f e r it  a b s t ra c t iv a , 
non in t u it iv a .  P e r ta lum  actum  f id e i p o te s t a p p a re re  res esse  p re se n s  
q u a n d o  e s t a b se n s , non tamen p e r  actum  e v id en tem ' (Q u o d lib o ta  V ,  q .5 ;  
L e f f ,  1975:21). A g a in  O ckham  sa fe g u a rd s  th e  r e l ia b il i t y  o f in tu it iv e  
c o g n it io n  as a p p lie d  to a c tu a l e x is te n c e  o r  n o n -e x is te n c e . It is  im p o rtan t 
to  no te , th o u g h , th a t one co u ld  be in t u it iv e ly  c e r ta in  th a t som eth ing  does 
no t e x is t ,  in w h ich  case  o f c o u rse  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  does p ro d u ce  c e r ­
ta in ty  a bo u t e x is te n c e  (D a y , 1947:175 and  B o e h n e r , 1943: 229-231). T h is  
is  not th e  same as b e in g  aw are o f an o b je c t th a t a c tu a lly  does not e x is t .  
A s  w ith  S c o tu s , O ckham  in s is t s  th a t bo th  co g n it io n s  a re  sp e c ie s  o f s im p le  
a p p re h e n s io n  o n ly ,  so in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  is  no t a judgm en t th a t a th in g
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e x is ts  (w h ich  w ou ld  be a 'c o g n it io  c o m p le x a )  b u t ra th e r  som eth ing  th a t 
enab le s  us to  e v a lu a te  a ju dgm en t abou t th a t th in g 's  e x is te n c e  (B o e h n e r , 
1943: 248 and  D ay , 1947: 173).
O ckham  has now a rg u e d  th e  c e r t itu d e  g u a ra n te e d  b y  in t u it iv e  co g n it io n  
fo r  im m ediate kn o w ledge , b u t has a most im p o rta n t f u r t h e r  s te p  to  ta ke . 
In v iew  o f th e  ax iom ' q u o te d  at th e  b e g in n in g  o f th is  e s s a y , i t  is  c ru c ia l 
th a t he p ro v e  th a t o u r  in te l le c ts  do p o sse ss  th is  im m ediate kno w ledge , 
o r  e lse  th e  b a r r ie r  betw een in te l le c t  and sen se s  has no t been dem o lish ed . 
A q u in a s  a lso  took  e x ce p t io n  to  th e  a x io m ', b u t p o s tu la te d  a sp e c ie s  to 
b r id g e  th e  aw kw a rd  g a p , w h ile  S co tu s  rem oved  th e  s p e c ie s , b u t o n ly  from  
in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n .
O ckham  s im p ly  p o in ts  o u t th a t th is  p r in c ip le ' is too r ig id :  o u r  in te l le c t  
does no t know  o n ly  th e  u n iv e r s a l,  and does not a lw ays  a b s t ra c t  from  th e  
h e re  and  now o f e x is te n c e . O u r  in te l le c t  does know  s in g u la r s ,  quod  e s t 
h ie  e t quod  e s t n u n c ’ (D a y , 1947:170): if  it  d id  not know  them  th u s  
e x is t e n t ia l ly , we co u ld  no t m ake ju dgm en ts  a bo u t c o n t in g e n t fa c ts . B u t  
s in c e  we do th u s  ju d g e , in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  m ust e x is t .
T h is  a rgum en t is  nea t, b u t  to  my m ind  th e  re a so n in g  is  fa u lt y .  O ckham  
w ish es  to  be a b s o lu te ly  s u re  abou t o u r  kn o w ledge  o f e x is te n t  fa c ts ,  so, 
from  e x p e r ie n c e , he o b se rv e s  th a t we do  have  th is  kno w ledge  o f th in g s  
a ro u n d  us ; and  c la im s th a t be cau se  we have  it ,  su ch  know ledge  m ust be 
c e r t a in .
In an y  ca se , in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  is  now e s ta b lis h e d  as th e  c o rn e rs to n e  of 
O ckham 's  th e o ry  o f human kno w ledge , a t le a s t as fa r  as he is  c o n ce rn e d , 
and as fa r  as p re s e n t  s itu a t io n s  a re  in q u e s t io n . W here p a s t e x is te n ce  
is  c o n c e rn e d , he fo llo w s  S co tu s  in d is t in g u is h in g  betw een p e r fe c t  and 
im p e rfe c t in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , th e  second  of w h ich  he a lso  c a lls  c o g n it io  
re c o rd a t iv a ' and  w h ich  is  d e f in e d  as th a t (s im p le ) kno w ledge  e n a b lin g  
one to  a s se n t to  a judgm en t (n o t, as D ay  s a y s , 1947: 181, to  m ake a 
ju d g m en t) abo u t a th in g 's  p a s t e x is te n c e ;  and abo u t its  fu tu re ,  th o u g h  
O ckham  does no t d e ve lo p  th is  a sp e c t and  n o r  d id  S c o tu s . T h e  qu e s t io n  
a r is e s ,  how does p e r fe c t  in t u it iv e  co g n it io n  p ro d u ce  th is  know ledge?
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T h e  a n sw e r  is  b ou nd  up  w ith  O ckh am 's  u se  o f th e  idea  o f 'h a b itu s '.  D ay  
p o in ts  o u t  C1947:18 2 f) th a t  th e  v e r y  d e f in it io n  o f th e  tw o c o g n it io n s  d e ­
m ands th e  p o s tu la t io n  o f som eth ing  o th e r  th an  e it h e r  to  e x p la in  o u r  
k n o w led g e  o f th e  p a s t in  th e  p re s e n t ,  fo r  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  can n o t 
b e  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  p re se n t e x is te n c e , and  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  is  o n ly  
c o n c e rn e d  w ith  it ;  t h is  'so m e th in g  e lse ' is  a h a b itu s ,  w h ich  is  an in c l i ­
n a tio n  o f th e  m ind  to w a rd s  p e r fo rm in g  an a c t o f m em ory, o f im p e r fe c t 
in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n .
R e p o r ta t io  II, w h e re  O ckham  in t ro d u c e s  th is  id ea , is  te x tu a l ly  o f in t e r e s t  
as i t  r e p re s e n ts  an e a r l ie r  and  u n re v is e d  s ta g e  o f h is  th o u g h t (O ckh am , 
1957; 1v an d  B oehm e r, 1943 :228 f). A t  some s ta g e  O ckh am ’ s th e o r ie s  of 
th e  u n iv e r s a l u n d e rw e n t a ch a n g e  from  th e  e a r lie s t  th e o ry  o f th e  f ic tu m ',  
w h e re  th e  f ic tu m  is  th e  o b je c t o f th e  a c t o f t h in k in g  (R e a d , 1977:26), 
to  th e  ' in te l le c t io ’ th e o ry ,  in  te rm s o f w h ich  th e  u n iv e r s a l its e l is  p u re ly  
a m enta l a c t . A s  I in te n d  to  show , th e  h a b itu s  th e o ry ,  th o u g h  an im ­
p ro v e m e n t on th e  sp e c ie s  th e o r y ,  le ave s  som e th ing  to  be d e s ir e d ,  and  it  
is  te m p t in g  to  th in k  th a t ,  had  he been ab le  to  r e v is e  th e  R e p o r ta t io ,  
O ckham  m ig h t h a ve  aban don ed  i t  a lto g e th e r .
In th e  R e p o r ta t io  it s e lf  O ckham  a c tu a lly  o f fe r s  tw o  v ie w s : 
f i r s t l y ,  th a t a long  w ith  an in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  th e re  is  a s im u ltaneou s  
a b s t ra c t iv e  one , et i lia  . . . e s t cau sa  p a r t ia l is  c o n c u r re n s  cum  in te lle c tu  
ad g en e ran dum  hab itum  in c lin a n te m  ad co gn it io n em  in tu it iv a m  im pe rfe c tu m ' 
(B o e h n e r , 1943:250); s e c o n d ly , th a t ( p e r fe c t)  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  it s e lf  
c au se s  a h a b itu s  w h ich  p ro d u c e s  co gn it io n em  a b s tra c t iv a m  s iv e  in tu it iv a m  
im perfe c tam ' (D a y , 1947: 181; B o e h n e r , 1943: 252). W h ile  L e ff  is  u n ­
c o n v in c e d  b y  B o e h n e r ’ s and  D a y 's  a rg u m en ts  as to  th e  ch ro n o lo g ic a l 
p r io r i t y  o f one o r  th e  o th e r ,  he b e lie v e s  th a t th e  f i r s t  v iew  was th a t 
e v e n tu a lly  p r e fe r r e d  b y  O ckham  (1975: 3 0 f) .
I see sn ag s  in  bo th  th e se  v ie w s : th e  f i r s t  v iew  seems to  fa v o u r  a more 
im m ed iate and  econom ica l a p p ro a ch  to  m em ory, w ith  tw o s ta ges  in s te ad  
o f th re e ;  b u t an im p e rfe c t in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , b e in g  b y  d e f in it io n  not 
c o n ce rn e d  w ith  th e  a c tua l e x is te n c e  o f th e  o b je c t th en  and  th e re , is in 
a sen se  a lre a d y  an a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n ;  it  is not c le a r  th en  w h y  th e re
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needs to  be s im u lta n e ity  o f two a c ts , one in t u it iv e ,  one  a b s t ra c t iv e .  A s  
F u ch s  p o in ts  o u t (1952 :35 ), im p e rfe c t in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  is  no t p u re  
a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  b eca u se  it  is not in d if fe r e n t  to  e x is te n c e , even  if 
o n ly  in  th e  p a s t.
T h e  second  v iew  o f h a b itu s ,  h o w eve r, a s su re s  th e  ab so lu te  ( c h ro n o lo g i­
ca l)  p r io r i t y  of th e  ro le  o f in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , w ith  its  concom itan t d eg ree  
o f c e r t a in t y ,  in  kn o w ledge  o f th e  p a s t, b u t  is no t so t ru e  to  p s y ch o lo g ic a l 
e x p e r ie n c e , w h ich  is  u s u a lly  aw are o f im m ediate m em ory ra th e r  th an  of 
a p ro c e s s . B u t in  bo th  cases h a b its  a re  p o s tu la te d  as a l in k  e x p la in in g  
h a b itu a l kno w led g e  (F u c h s , 1952:28). It w ou ld  seem th e n , as th o u g h  
h a b it s ,  ju s t  l ik e  s p e c ie s , c o n t ra d ic t  th e  p r in c ip le  o f econom y (and  indeed  
it  is in  an e a r ly  w o rk  th a t th e y  do a p p e a r) ,  b u t it  s h o u ld  be no ted  th a t 
th e y  a re  s im p ly  d is p o s it io n s  o f th e  m ind  to w a rd s  rem em bering  th e  p a s t - 
p u re ly  p s y ch o lo g  ca l r a th e r  th an  both  in  th e  m ind and  in  th in g s ,  l ik e  th e  
sp e c ie s  (R e a d , 1977:22).
It is th o u g h t th a t O ckham  ad h e red  f in a l ly  to  th e  f i r s t  th e o ry  (D a y , 1947: 
182 and  L e f f ,  1975: 30; c f .  B o e h n e r, 1943: 226f, who fo r  some reason  
sa y s  it  is  th e  second  th e o r y ) .  If so , th en  he ended  up  d e c la r in g  th a t 
p e r fe c t  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  o f an o b je c t is  th e  p a r t ia l cau se  o f ( c o n c u r re n t)  
a b s t ra c t iv e  kn o w ledge  o f th e  same o b je c t, w h ich  a b s t ra c t iv e  kn o w ledge  
is in  tu rn  th e  p a r t ia l cau se  in  re sp e c t o f a h a b it  o f co gn it io n em  
a b s t ra c t iv a m  incom p lexam ' (o r  im p e rfe c t in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n ) ;  w hen th e  
in te l le c t  fo rm s th e  p ro p o s it io n  th a t th is  th in g  e x is te d  ( i . e . ,  no lo n g e r  
e x is t s ) ,  th e  in te l le c t  is  in c lin e d  b y  th e  h a b it to  kn o w ledge  o f th e  th in g 's  
p a s t e x is te n c e  (B o e h n e r , 1943: 251; D ay , 1947: 186; L e f f ,  1975:33).
So th e  ro le  o f in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  is  once aga in  fu n d am en ta l, bo th  in 
h e lp in g  to  fo rm  th e  f i r s t  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n , and  in  c o n s t it u t in g  the  
h a b it o f second  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  w h ich  lead s to  kn o w ledge  o f p a s t 
e x p e r ie n c e . (T h e  p a ra g ra p h  from  w h ich  I quo ted  above  (G ) is ,  a c c o rd in g  
to  B o e h n e r , 1943: 226, 244, a la te r  a d d it io n  made b y  O ckham  to  
s tre n g th e n  h is  p r e fe r r e d  p o s it io n . )
G ra n te d  th e  rea son s w h y  O ckham  p o s tu la te d  th e  h a b itu s  (to  s a fe g u a rd  
kno w ledge  o f th e  p a s t as w e ll as th e  p re s e n t ) ,  w h y  sh o u ld  a h a b itu s .
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p r e c is e ly ,  and  no t som eth ing  e ls e , be ca lle d  fo r ?  O ckham  is  m ost l ik e ly  
fo llo w in g  S co tu s  o r  S c o t is t ic  th o u g h t h e re  (D a y , 1947:188), in  w h ich  case  
h is  co n ce p t io n  o f h a b itu s  p ro b a b ly  d ra w s  on th a t  o f th e  sp e c ie s  
in t e l l ig ib i l i s ' . T h o u g h  O ckh am 's  h a b itu s  is  no t e x te rn a l to  th e  m ind  as 
is  S c o tu s 's  s p e c ie s , i t  is  n e v e r th e le s s  an e x t r a  q u a lit y  and  w ou ld  seem 
to  w eaken  O ckh am 's  d e n ia l o f in te rm e d ia r ie s ,  e s p e c ia lly  s p e c ie s . B u t  
w h e re  S co tu s  had s a id  th a t th e  a c t iv e  in te l le c t  and  th e  o b je c t a re  th e  
s u f f ic ie n t  cau se  o f th e  sp e c ie s  (D a y , 1947:189) O ckham , u s in g  p r a c t ic a l ly  
th e  same fo rm u la , does add  th a t th e  a c t iv e  in te l le c t  an d  th e  o b je c t a re  
th e  s u f f ic ie n t  a g e n t o f th e  sa id  ( i . e .  in t u it iv e )  c o g n it io n  (B o e h n e r , 
1943:254; p a ra g ra p h  O ) . F u r th e rm o re , he d e c la re s ,  th e re  is  no 'r a t io  
c e r ta  p ro ce d e n s  ex  p e r  se n o t is  v e l e x p e r ie n t ia  c e r t a ' ( ib id . ) .  In o th e r  
w o rd s , O ckham  re fu s e s  to  adm it th e o r ie s  no t ba sed  on e x p e r ie n c e  o r  on 
s e lf - e v id e n t  (no t m e re ly  e v id e n t)  p r in c ip le s ,  s u ch  as th e  m e ta p h y s ic a l 
ones he ld  b y  th e  p ro p o n e n ts  o f th e  'a x iom ' w ith  w h ich  th is  e s sa y  b eg an . 
H is  p o in t is ,  th e re fo re ,  th a t s in c e  a ll k n o w led g e , w h e th e r  a b s t ra c t iv e  o r  
no t, is b a sed  u lt im a te ly  on p e r fe c t  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , in  w h ich  th e re  is 
d e f in ite ly  no in te rm e d ia ry  betw een in te l le c t  an d  o b je c t (n o t e ven  a 
h a b it u s ) ,  th e re  is  no e x te rn a )  in te rm e d ia ry  in  a n y  k in d  o f k n o w ledge .
P a u s in g  and  ta k in g  s to c k ,  we f in d  th a t  O ckham  has b eg u n  w ith  tw o d e ­
s ir e s :  to  a t ta in  c e r t it u d e  a b o u t kn o w led g e , and  to  do  aw ay w ith  u n n e c ­
e s s a ry  h y p o th e t ic a l b a r r ie r s  to  su ch  c e r t a in t y .  He has ad o p ted  S c o tu s 's  
d is t in c t io n  betw een  in t u it iv e  and  a b s t ra c t iv e  kn o w led g e , a g re e in g  w ith  
S co tu s  th a t no sp e c ie s  o f a n y  s o r t  is  r e q u ire d  f o r  i n t u i t i v e  c o g n it io n  
a n d , b y  b a s in g  h is  th e o ry  o f a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  on th e  p r io r  o r  a t le a s t 
s im u lta n e ou s  o c c u r r e n c e  o f in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , has done  aw ay w ith  th e  
sp e c ie s  th e re . C e r t a in ly  th e re  is  an o b je c t p re s e n t  to  th e  in te l le c t  (w h ich  
is  a re m in d e r  th a t  th is  th e o ry  was he ld  b e fo re  O ckham  p o s ite d  th e  
' in te l le c t io ’ th e o ry  e x c lu s iv e ly ) ,  b u t  it  c a n n o t be a s p e c ie s :  i f  th e  o b je c t 
is  p u r e ly  m en ta l, i t  w ill h a ve  been c au sed  b y  an a c t o f c o g n it io n ;  if th e  
o b je c t is  p h y s ic a l ly  p re s e n t ,  th e re  w ill be  an im m ed iate c o g n it io n  o f i t  
a n yw ay  (B o e h n e r ,  1943: 268, p a ra g ra p h  MM, w h ich  is  in  d ir e c t  a n sw e r 
to  S c o tu s ) .
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In th e  p la ce  o f th e  s p e c ie s , h o w eve r, O ckham  has le f t  us w ith  a h a b itu s ,  
som eth ing  in t r in s ic ,  no t e x t r in s ic ,  to  th e  m ind , in  th e  ca se  o f th e  second 
a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  w h ich  ta ke s  p la ce  in  th e  a c tu a l a c t o f re co lle c t io n  
( th e  f i r s t  b e in g  c o n c u r r e n t  w ith  th e  in it ia l a c t o f p e r fe c t  in t u it iv e  c o g ­
n it io n ) .  H en ce  - in  th is  u n re v is e d  w o rk  - O ckham  a ch ie v e s  c e r ta in t y  
a b o u t e x te rn a l a f fa ir s  a t th e  e x p en se  o f an in te rn a l la c k  o f econom y. 
A t  le a s t th e  h a b itu s  fo l lo w s  a n y  a c ts , u n lik e  th e  sp e c ie s , w h ich  'autem  
(a c tu s )  non s e q u it u r  sed  p re c e d it ' ( B o e h n e r , 1943: 255, p a ra g ra p h  R; 
L e f f ,  1975: 3 6 ) . It c a n n o t th e re fo re  h a ve  a n y  in f lu e n c e  on su ch  m enta l 
a c ts .
O ckham ’ s c o n c lu s io n s  th e n  a re  th a t  fo r  ( s e n s it iv e )  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  a ll 
th a t  is  r e q u ir e d  is  th e  c o rp o re a l pow e r ( th e  sen se s )  and  th e  o b je c t 
w ith o u t a n y  sp e c ie s ;  f o r  in te lle c tu a l c o g n it io n  th e  o b je c t and  th e  in te l le c t  
s u f f ic e .  F o r  p r im a ry  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n , w h ich  c o -e x is t s  ( 's t a t ')  w ith  
in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , ( p e r fe c t )  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  and  th e  in te l le c t  s u f f ic e ,  
b u t  fo r  s e c o n d a ry  a b s t ra c t iv e  c o g n it io n  a h a b it  is  r e q u ire d  as w e ll 
(B o e h n e r , 1943:270; p a ra g ra p h  P P ) .
C o n se qu en ce s
No lo n g e r  is th e re  a g ap  betw een th e  in te l le c t  and  th e  se n se s , b u t  th e y  
a re  show n to  co -o p e ra te  c lo s e ly ;  th e  in t r in s ic  p s y c h o lo g ic a l u n ity  o f man 
is  th u s  s a fe g u a rd e d . S e c o n d ly , o u r  know ledge  of p re s e n t  p a r t ic u la r s  
becom es m ore im m ediate (no t in th e  sen se  o f a f la s h  o f in s ig h t  b u t in  th e  
sen se  th a t th e  o b je c t know n is  p re s e n t  to  th e  m ind ; D ay , 1947:208). In 
o th e r  w o rd s , p a r t ic u la r s  a re  no lo n g e r  at a second  rem ove, th o u g h  th e  
h a b itu s  th e o ry  w ou ld  su g g e s t at le a s t a m ental d is ta n c e  from  o u r  p a s t. 
B u t  th is  is  e v id e n t  from  e x p e r ie n ce : o u r  p a s t is no t p h y s ic a l ly  a c c e s s ib le  
to  u s , and  th e  e a r lie r  an e v e n t has o c c u r re d  in th e  p a s t , th e  m ore d i f ­
f ic u lt  it  is  to  re c a ll.
T h i r d ly ,  s in c e  th o se  in d iv id u a ls  b e fo re  us do no t h a ve  some a b s t ra c ta b le  
e sse n ce  e x t ra  to  t h e ir  b e in g , o r  w h ich  g iv e s  them  th e ir  b e in g , o u r  d e r ­
iv a t io n  o f u n iv e r s a ls  w ill a lso  b eg in  w ith  in d iv id u a ls  and  no t th e  o th e r  
w ay a b o u t. F o u r th ly ,  s in c e  th e re  is n o th in g  to  a b s t ra c t ,  th e re  need be
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no th e o ry  o f a b s t ra c t io n  as in  A q u in a s , w ith  its  a cco m pan y in g  u n w ie ld y  
th e o ry  o f i l lu m in a t io n . O ckham  has m oved q u ite  a d is ta n c e  from  
A r is to te lia n is m  in  th is  r e sp e c t.
F i f t h ly ,  s in c e  a ll kno w led g e  b e g in s  w ith  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , an e m p ir ic a l 
s c ie n t if ic  m ethod  is  ju s t if ie d  fo r  th e  f i r s t  tim e - one now b e g in s  w ith  
e v id e n c e  abo u t da ta  a n d , re a so n in g  from  th e re , a r r iv e s  at s c ie n t if ic  
th e o r ie s .  A n d  s ix t h ly ,  b y  th e  same to k e n , kno w led g e  even  o f o n e se lf 
is  c e r ta in :  no t th a t a th e o ry  o f th e  n a tu re  o f o n e 's  b e in g  is in t u it iv e ly  
kno w n , b u t th a t in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  does in fo rm  one o f th e  (em o tiona l) 
s ta te  o f one  s m ind  and  th a t  it  is  'm y' m ind . A p p ro p r ia te  a n a ly s is  o f th e se  
s ta te s  w ill p ro v id e  in fo rm a t io n  abou t th e  n a tu re  o f o n e ’ s b e in g  and  o th e r  
b e in g s , w h ich  can lead  to  a p ro o f fo r  th e  e x is te n c e  o f God  (D a y , 
1947:212 f).
M o re o ve r , th e  d o c t r in e  o f th e  tw o c o g n it io n s  has im p lic a t io n s  fo r  O ckham 's  
te a c h in g  on s ig n if ic a t io n  and  h is  c o n ce p tu a lism , w h ich  I s h a ll e x p lo re  
b r ie f ly  h e re . T o  u n d e rs ta n d  a p ro p o s it io n  one has to  h ave  u n d e rs to o d  
its  te rm s w ith  th e  he lp  o f th e  tw o c o g n it io n s  (B o e h n e r , 1943:224). S in ce  
O ckham  c a lls  e v e ry th in g  w h ich  m akes som eth ing  ( d if f e r e n t  from  it s e lf )  
know n a s ig n , no t ju s t  s e n s ib le  fa c ts  (B o e h n e r ,  1958:202), te rm s s ig n if y  
th ro u g h  s ig n s , and  s ig n s  a lone . B e cau se  we a re  in te re s te d  c h ie f ly  in 
th o se  sen te n ce s  w h ich  a re  t ru e  o r  fa ls e , i . e .  p ro p o s it io n s  o r  d e c la r a ­
t io n s , we a re  in te re s te d  in  th e  ( la n g u a g e -)  s ig n s  fo u n d  in su ch  sen ten ce s  
(B o e h n e r , 1958:211).
W h ile  s ig n s  in g e n e ra l lead  o n ly  to  a s e c o n d a ry  o r  a b s t ra c t iv e  know ledge  
on th e  b a s is  o f h a b it  d e r iv e d  from  a p r im a ry  c o g n it io n  (B o e h n e r , 
1958:213; see a lso  203 ), th is  lim ita t io n  does not a p p ly  to  m ental lan g u ag e  
s ig n s  o r  c o n c e p ts , w h ich  m ake a kno w led g e  know n w h ich  is  o b ta in e d  b y  
in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n :  th e y  a re  a c ts  o f th o u g h t b y  w h ich  som eth ing  is  
c o n c e iv e d , at a n y  ra te  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  in te l le c t io  th e o ry  (B o e h n e r , 
1958:215). If th e y  c o n ce iv e  a s in g u la r  th in g ,  we sp eak  o f s in g u la r  
c o n ce p ts ;  b u t if  th e y  co n ce iv e  o f m any th in g s  e q u a lly  and  s ig n if y  them  
in d is c r im in a te ly ,  we sp ea k  o f u n iv e r s a l c o n ce p ts  (B o e h n e r , 1958:216).
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It is th is  a b i l it y  to  have  m ean ing  - to  s ig n if y  - w h ich  en ab le s  mental 
la n g u ag e  s ig n s  to  be used  in  p ro p o s it io n s .
M en ta l lan g u ag e  s ig n s  c o rre s p o n d  w ith  spoken  lan g u ag e  s ig n s  w h ich  
s ig n if y  them  and  a re  th e re fo re  su b o rd in a te d  to  them  (B o e h n e r , 1958:219),
i .e .  sp oken  s ig n s  can n o t s ig n if y  w ith o u t th e re  b e in g  m ental ones a s s o c i­
a ted  w ith  them , o r  to  p u t it  in  a n o th e r  w a y , w o rd s  a re  c o n v e n t io n a l s ig n s  
im posed to  s ig n if y  w h a t is a lre a d y  n a tu ra lly  know n in  th e  sou l as a 
co n ce p t ( L e f f ,  1975:125). B y  s ig n if y ' O ckham  g e n e ra lly  means (o f la n ­
guage  s ig n s )  th a t a s ig n  is  u sed  o r  can be used  in a p ro p o s it io n  re la t in g  
to  p a s t , p re s e n t  and  fu tu r e ,  and in su ch  a way th a t it  ta k e s  th e  p lace  
o f w hat is s ig n if ie d  if  a p ro p o s it io n  is  fo rm u la ted  (B o e h n e r , 1958:231).
M enta l la n g u ag e  s ig n s  a re  th u s  th e  b a s is  fo r  th e  te rm s o f a n y  p ro p o s it io n  
w h ich  is  u t te re d  o r  fo rm u la ted  in spoken  o r  w r it te n  la n g u a g e  s ig n s ,  i .e .  
th e  b a s is  o f an y  p ro p o s it io n  w h a tso e ve r. S in ce  th e y  s ig n if y  a n a tu ra l 
k n o w ledge  w h ich  is o b ta in e d  b y  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n , w h e th e r  th is  in t u it iv e  
c o g n it io n  is  p e r fe c t  o r  im p e r fe c t, one has a b a s is  o f c e r t it u d e  to  w o rk  
from  in  d e te rm in in g  th e  t r u th  o r  fa ls it y  o f p ro p o s it io n s ;  th e  m ean ing  o f 
co n v o n t io n a l te rm s - w r it te n  o r  sp oken  lan g u ag e  s ig n s  - co u ld  ho w eve r 
c h a n g e . L e ff  (1975:101) rem a rks  th a t fo r  O ckham  m enta l la n g u a g e  s ig n s  
a re  no t m ere m ental p ic tu re s ,  s in c e  th e y  do  h a ve  re p re se n ta t io n a l s ig ­
n if ic a n c e ;  he is c o r r e c t  if  he m eans th a t th e se  s ig n s  a re  no t s ta t ic  b u t 
p la y  an a c t iv e  ro le , u n lik e  th e  f ic tu m  - c o n cep ts  h a ve  rea l m ean ing  in  
s ta n d in g  fo r  som eth ing  w h ich  e x is t s  o u ts id e  th e  m ind .
O ckham , it  w ill be  no ted , does no t d is t in g u is h  betw een k n o w in g  a co n ce p t 
and  k n o w in g  a th in g .  T h is  ra is e s  d i f f ic u lt ie s :  is  th e  co n ce p t no t th en  
a d e f in ite  o b je c t , a f ic tu m , if  th e  s ig n  is  know n b e fo re  th e  th in g  s ig n i ­
fie d ?  O r ,  if  th e  th in g  s ig n if ie d  is  know n d i r e c t ly ,  th e n  th e re  w ill be  
no d if fe r e n c e  be tw een  kn o w in g  a co n cep t and  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n  o f w hat 
is  kno w n . B o th  th e se  a lte rn a t iv e s ,  h o w eve r, u n d e rc u t  O ckh am 's  th e o r ie s  
and  th e  o n ly  so lu t io n  is  to  adm it th e  d u a l n a tu re  o f a s ig n ,  b o th  as th e  
su b je c t o f an a c t o f know ledge  and  as som eth ing  know n in  th e  m ind ; fo r  
u n le s s  a s ig n  is  kno w n , it  can no t s ig n if y  ( L o u x , 1974:50).
C o n c lu s io n
O ckh a m ’ s ep is te m o lo g y  b e g in s  w ith  th e  h ie  et n u n c ’ and  has p s y c h o lo g ic a l 
im p lic a t io n s  in s o fa r  as it  exam ines w h a t we know  o f o u r s e lv e s  and  o b je c ts  
o u ts id e  o f o u r s e lv e s ;  it  a lso  s t re s s e s  th e  u n ity  o f m ind  and  b o d y . 
T h o u g h  he m en tio n s fu tu r e  kn w o led g e , l ik e  h is  p re d e c e s s o r  S co tu s  he 
p a y s  l i t t le  a t te n t io n  to  it ;  w h ile  he b re a k s  aw ay a lm ost co m p le te ly  from  
th e  l im ita t io n s  o f th e  A r is to te l ia n  ax iom ’ w ith  w h ich  we b eg an , as A q u in a s  
and  S co tu s  a lso  a ttem p ted  to  do , he fo llow s  th e  la t t e r  tw o o n ly  p a r t ly ,  
in s is t in g  m ore s t r o n g ly  th an  th e y  on th e  n e c e s s ity  fo r  d e f in ite  and  im ­
m ed ia te  c e r t it u d e  w ith  no b a r r ie r s  in te rp o s e d . H is  ep is te m o lo g y  th u s  a lso  
has im p o rta n t im p lic a t io n s  fo r  an e m p ir ic a l a p p ro a ch  to  s c ie n ce  and  
kn o w led g e  in  g e n e r a l , 1 and  c le a rs  th e  way fo r  a s y s te m a t ic  d eve lo pm en t 
o f lo g ic  in  th a t  it  p ro v id e s  m ore c e r t a in t y  abou t b e in g  ab le  to  know  th e  
te rm s o f p ro p o s it io n s ,  w h ich  a re  s ig n if ie d  b y  s ig n s ,  w h i h a re  know n 
b y  in t u it iv e  c o g n it io n .
It s h o u ld  be c le a r  from  m y a rg u m e n t in  th is  e ssa y  th a t I w o u ld  re g a rd  
s ta tem en ts  su ch  as th e  fo llo w in g , w h ich  a re  not uncom m on, w ith  le ss  
th an  en th u s ia sm : ( S c ie n t if ic )  k n o w ledge  was s e v e re ly  lim ite d . F o r  
O ckham , it  is  no t th a t we can n o t know  in  some sense a n y th in g  abou t 
th e  n a tu ra l w o r ld  so m uch as we ca n n o t know  a n y th in g  abo u t th e  
n a tu ra l w o r ld  w ith  a b so lu te  c e r t a in t y .  T h is  fo llo w s  from  th e  a b so lu te  
p ow e r o f G o d ' (S a g a l, 1982:90).
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